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Industry Strategic  Planning:  Keeping  Supply  Chains
Competitive
Conrad P. Lyford, H. Christopher Peterson and James A. Sterns
Agricultural  industries  are increasingly  challenged to  develop  strategies  that enable them,  as  a group  of firms  and
industry organizations,  to respond to an increasingly global marketplace. One approach used by several industries is the
application  of strategic planning  and management  tools, commonly  used in a single business  setting,  to coordinate
analysis  and action at an industry level.  This is accomplished  through a relation-based  strategic  group of firms from
multiple levels in the vertical supply chain. Here it is suggested that this type of strategic effort, called industry strategic
planning, provides unique benefits for industries engaged in such an effort, including limiting incentives for increased
concentration and vertical  integration. As such, industry strategic planning can be a useful method for revitalizing and
sustaining agricultural  industries.
The  dynamic  forces  changing  the  structure  of
today's  agri-food  system  appear  to  favor large
multinational conglomerates  and/or highly concen-
trated domestic firms that are integrated either hori-
zontally,  vertically,  or both.  Recent congressional
hearings  and  increasing producer  concerns  about
market  concentration  and  the  growing  power  of
integrators highlight deeply felt anxieties about the
future  of the system.  Furthermore,  the consolida-
tion and concentration threatens the viability of rural
communities  and support institutions,  and the tra-
ditional  market  alternatives  of cooperatives,  mar-
keting  orders,  and  commodity  associations  seem
to have limited success  countering the key trends.
In fact, traditional cooperatives themselves are be-
coming increasingly concentrated.
This paper shows that strategic  planning prin-
ciples and associated analyses that are widely used
in the academic  field and actual business practice
of firm management can be adapted in order to con-
duct industry strategic  planning and coordination
(ISPC) for agricultural commodity industries.  Sev-
'In  this setting,  industry refers  to  firms  and industry-
support  organizations  involved  in producing  and marketing
an agricultural commodityfrom  a particular  region. As such,
the terms regional  industry and industry are interchangeable.
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eral industries that have been involved in some form
of ISPC  include  the  Michigan  apple,  U.S.  tart
cherry, Ohio pork, Ohio dairy, and Texas vegetable
industries. Most recently, Hall and Lyford published
research that illustrated ISPC efforts and an ISPC
framework in the Texas vegetable industry.
ISPC is presented as  an alternative  to historic
responses to exogenous  shocks to agricultural  in-
dustries. In a process repeated countless times over
history,  an industry  is hit with  a shock (e.g.,  dra-
matic change  in international trade  policy) which
begins  to  negatively  affect  the  economic  and  fi-
nancial performance of individual firms within the
industry. Industry leaders begin to ask one another,
"What can be done?" As these leaders interact in-
formally at extension meetings, trade shows, state
fairs,  and producer  meetings,  ideas  for  industry
action begin to crystalize and informal agreements
about working together for common goals begin to
emerge.2 Then flesh  is put to the bone and some-
thing is created. Historically, these entities for work-
ing together have included cooperatives, commod-
ity associations,  and marketing orders. With these
entities,  individual  firms within an  industry have
been able to work on shared objectives and coordi-
nate  their  strategic  responses  to the  exogenous
shock. This paper argues that these responses have
not fully realized the benefits of coordinating  stra-
tegic  responses,  and offers  ISPC as  a  method for
proactively  improving this performance.
A number of important research  questions or
issues  emerge when considering ISPC as an alter-
native for sustaining the competitiveness of supply
2  This is  essentially the concept of grassroots collective
action that was discussed by Harry Ayer (1997).Journal  of Food Distribution  Research
chains. These include  1) how does ISPC compare
to firm strategic planning and to traditional group-
action alternatives  such  as  cooperatives,  market-
ing orders,  and commodity  associations?  2)  how
might  market-structure  characteristics  affect the
need for ISPC? 3) what are the benefits from ISPC?
and 4) could  industry  strategic  planning  lead to
collusion? After presenting two examples of indus-
try strategic planning to provide empirical motiva-
tion for  the  concept,  this paper sequentially  ad-
dresses each of these questions in separate sections.
Industry Strategic Planning  in  the Michigan
Apple Industry
Recent history in the Michigan apple industry pro-
vides an illustration  of ISPC. The Michigan apple
industry has played an important and longstanding
role in Michigan, providing a substantial stream of
income  for  rural  communities.  It includes  apple
processors, apple producers,  fresh marketers,  and
industry organizations  serving those groups. In the
mid-1990s  the apple  industry  faced  a number of
important threats and opportunities typical of many
agricultural  industries.  For  example,  there  were
increasing  supplies and competition from the state
of Washington and from large imports of apple juice
concentrate. Other key threats included restrictions
on the use of pesticides  and other increases in en-
vironmental  legislation  (Woods  1995).
Opportunities for industry efforts  were recog-
nized in several areas, including improving quality
management  for  the fresh  market,  increasing  ex-
ports, and utilizing technical innovations through-
out the industry. Overall, there was recognition that
a certain level ofjoint effort was necessary to fully
capture opportunities  for the industry.
The Michigan apple industry recognized these
threats and  opportunities  along with the underly-
ing need  to better meet customer  needs.3 The  in-
dustry responded in the early 1990s by forming The
Michigan  Apple Industry Strategic Planning Task
Force that included representatives  from all major
industry segments,  university researchers  and ex-
tension, and industry producer and commodity or-
3 A  relation-based  strategic  alliance  is  built upon  the
mutual interests and  shared objectives  of the members of the
alliance,  as  opposed  to  an  equity-based  alliance  in  which
members  share  equity  ownership  of some common  assets
(Wysocki and Peterson  1998  ).
ganizations.  This Task Force used strategic-plan-
ning tools to develop strategies to improve Michi-
gan apple industry performance. The strategic-plan-
ning and management tools used included internal
and external  analysis, the setting of long-term ob-
jectives, and the development and implementation
of strategies.
These strategies worked toward improving ver-
tical coordination in the industry, providing indus-
try public goods, and enhancing communication and
providing information on areas of mutual interest,
i.e.,  selected  areas where  a combination of firms
and  industry  organizations  were  expected  to  im-
prove performance. For example, one area in which
the industry  focused  considerable  effort  was the
improvement of quality management  for the fresh
market.  Firms  and industry  organizations worked
together voluntarily.  Strategies to address this area
included a maturity-information program, pre-har-
vest workshops, and information on quality incen-
tives.  These  efforts  were  supported by the  apple
marketers, the generic promotion organization, and
university extension.  In addition, apple marketers
and producers independently made changes to im-
prove quality through investments  and changes in
management  practices.
The Texas Vegetable  Industry
Historically,  Texas has ranked third behind Florida
and California in terms of total U.S. vegetable and
melon production. However, according to the 1998
Vegetable Summary,  Texas  dropped to  a distant
fourth. Data also show a steady  decline in overall
vegetable  acreage in Texas over the past 50 years.
Some, but not all, of the decline can be attributed
to increased yields per acre resulting from improved
genetics and cultural practices. However, the yield
increase for most crops (such as tomatoes and spin-
ach) over time  has  not been of the magnitude  to
offset the overall decline in acreage.
In the past, the early markets enjoyed by Texas
producers and the resulting prices associated  with
these markets enabled the industry to survive (and
sometimes  thrive).  However,  these  early market
advantages  have been  slowly eroded  to the point
that many Texas  producers  are now suffering  fi-
nancial stress.  Symptoms of this  stress can be dif-
ficult to detect, but the most recent evidence of its
existence comes in the form of the declining acre-
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age  mentioned  earlier,  reduced  profitability  at  all
levels of the vegetable  value  chain  (grower  and
shipper  alike),  and even  the  elimination  (bank-
ruptcy) of some industry firms.  In addition,  grow-
ers and shippers contend that price levels have been
at or below  break-even  at the variable  cost level,
with  little  revenue  remaining  for replacing  and
maintaining fixed assets (Hall and Lyford 2001).
In the late  1990s industry leaders in the Texas
vegetable  industry recognized these challenges to
the industry and formed a  strategic  planning task
force that included representatives  from organiza-
tions similar to those  in the Michigan apple indus-
try discussed earlier. This task force used strategic
planning tools to develop strategies to improve the
performance of the Texas vegetable industry. Key
strategies were developed and are in the process of
being implemented in a number of areas, including
developing  an industry-wide  onion exchange  and
expanding industry-wide promotion.
The  Industry  Strategic  Planning  and
Coordination Concept
ISPC is a method that uses the techniques of firm-
level  strategic  management  to  systematically  set
industry-level goals and strategies designed to en-
hance the competitiveness  of an agri-food supply
chain. As  intended here,  ISPC is a method  spon-
sored and implemented by a relation-based  group
of the producers,  assemblers,  and processors of an
industry.4 The group is formed specifically to en-
gage  in  common  analysis  and  decision  making
across  a broad agenda of issues that may include
any strategic  concern  or opportunity  deemed  rel-
evant to industry performance.
Firms  commonly  use strategic  planning  and
management tools to prepare themselves  for long-
term  competitive  success  (Pearce  and  Robinson
1997; Thompson and Strickland 1995). A strategic
management  effort typically includes  developing
a situational  analysis, long- and short-term  objec-
tives,  strategies  for  success,  and  implementation
action plans.  Industry  strategic  planning is based
on the notion that an industry can adapt firm-level
tools to set the stage for future competitive success
in the entire agri-food supply chain.5The equiva-
lent of the firm-level  decision maker is the group
of leaders representing processors, assemblers, pro-
ducers, and others within the relevant industry (Fig-
ure  1). It is this group which drives ISPC.
ISPC is appreciably  different  from firm-level
strategic planning and management.  A commodity
industry  is made  up of a complex  set of firms at
various vertical stages in the marketing chain. These
firms  have  differing  core  business strategies  and
various  levels of vertical and horizontal linkages.
Commodity  industries  also include  industry  sup-
port organizations, e.g., promotional commissions,
industry associations,  or grower/producer  groups.
Furthermore,  because  of these  numerous partici-
pants, no clear-cut  leader (comparable to a firm's
CEO  or executive  committee)  exists with  the re-
sponsibility and authority to lead the development
and  implementation  of performance-improving
strategies  for an  industry.  The  main  differences
between ISPC and firm-level strategic management
arise from this inherently  fragmentary nature of a
commodity industry.
The justification for engaging in industry stra-
tegic planning has much in common, as argued in
the subsequent sections, with traditional group-ac-
tion institutions  in agriculture,  e.g.,  cooperatives,
marketing orders, and generic promotion commit-
tees. Where they exist, industry strategic planning
even uses these traditional institutions.  However,
it is distinct from these institutions because the more
traditional  organizations  have  more narrowly  de-
fined objectives that typically encompass a smaller
part of the entire value chain and do not focus on a
broad industry agenda.
The distinction between ISPC and more tradi-
tional forms of group action in agriculture requires
some further elaboration. Cooperatives, marketing
orders,  commodity-promotion  committees,  and
commodity  associations  focused on research  and
development have a long and successful history in
agriculture  that has been described and discussed
in many works (e.g., Peterson and Anderson  1996;
French  1982;  Jesse  1987;  Kaiser and  Liu  1998;
Wills and Cox 1988). However, these grou- action
strategies all share several characteristics that limit
4 The term  customer in this  context  is meant  to refer
broadly to both trade customers (e.g., retailers, processors)  and
final  customers (e.g.,  consumers).
5 The adaptation  of firm strategic management tools  to
the industry  context is more fully documented  in Ricks  and
Woods (1996)  and in Lyford et al. (1998).
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their  applicability  to  the food  system currently
emerging. First, they are commonly focused on the
producer level in the marketing chain.  They assist
producers  in coming  together (i.e.,  forming hori-
zontal alliances) in order to improve their strategic
position in the vertical chain (e.g., forming a coop-
erative to process commodities into a value-added
form or promoting generic demand expansion with
final  consumers).  Because  these  institutions  are
focused  on producer benefits, they may miss op-
portunities  to improve  supply-chain  management
that must, by definition, include others in the verti-
cal chain.  Second, none of these institutions alone
appears to offer an especially effective alternative
to  smaller industry  firms  who  wish to withstand
the forces of consolidation  or strong private inte-
grators.  For example,  few cooperatives  have sur-
vived in the highly integrated poultry industry. In-
stead,  strong  private  integrators-e.g.,  Tyson-
have taken the lead. Third, many of these traditional
Figure 1. Typical  Groups that Particiapte in an Industry Strategic Planning "Alliance."
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institutions have a limited scope. Promotion com-
mittees  focus  on limited elements  of a  full prod-
uct-marketing  strategy since they typically do not
actually market products. Commodity associations
tend  to  focus  on production-oriented  research  or
political issues facing an industry rather than a full
range of strategic issues.  Their agendas thus tend
to be  focused on narrow  programs  that are  fixed
across time and may or may not represent the most
pressing strategic needs of an industry.
Industry strategic planning has the potential to
overcome each of these limitations  of existing in-
stitutions  because  it brings  together  many of the
main actors/entities  of the supply chain.6 It  at-
tempts to coordinate the actions of fragmented firms
without forcing consolidation or complete integra-
tion, and an ISPC effort typically focuses  only on
selected  areas of mutual  interest.  Firms  typically
are able to  choose what efforts  they want to par-
ticipate in; i.e., an ISPC effort is largely voluntary.
This stands in contrast to strategies that have sub-
stantial  mandatory components,  such as develop-
ing a new federal marketing order that sets quality
standards. Finally, it places the whole range of po-
tential strategic issues on the ISPC agenda and cre-
ates a forum for that agenda to be focused and re-
focused  as  the  competitive  environment  evolves
through time.
Market Structure Characteristics Consistent
with ISPC
To  understand  the  market  conditions  that  make
ISPC  a relevant  alternative  it  is necessary  to  re-
view  the  common  characteristics  of agricultural
industries.  These  features  include  a  fragmented
marketing  chain,  commodity  production,  large
numbers  of producers  and marketers,  uncertainty
about quantity and  quality,  inelastic  demand,  and
asset specificity and fixity. While individual indus-
tries have these characteristics  to varying degrees,
these are typical features that are consistent across
many agricultural industries and have been broadly
documented  in  the agricultural  economics  litera-
ture  (Marion  1986).  The performance of agricul-
6 As can be  seen in Figure  1, groups  typically  involved
do not  include  retailers.  Retailers  are often  served by many
industries and as such are not tied to or closely linked with a
particular industry.
tural industries  is affected in many important and
negative ways by these structural conditions as sum-
marized  in Table  1. These  same conditions  have
formed the  historic  basis for justifying the  other
forms of group action mentioned above. However,
it should be noted that even for industries that do
not have  these  features,  some  form of collabora-
tive  industry efforts is often useful. For example,
the computer industry commonly discusses indus-
try technology standards. The key issue is that when
the  structural conditions  described in  Table  1 are
present, the needs are particularly pressing.
When  there  are economic  benefits from  en-
hanced coordination,  it can be predicted that orga-
nizational  innovations  will  occur  to  capture  the
benefits (Williamson  1985,  124-25). Clearly, one
organizational  innovation  creating  the  high  level
of concern  noted at the beginning of this article  is
consolidation,  as agricultural  industries  become
more  closely integrated  with fewer firms.  Other
group-action  alternatives  can also address  certain
of these performance problems, e.g., marketing or-
ders for over- or under- supply conditions, process-
ing cooperatives to manage quality concerns, com-
modity-promotion programs to improve generic de-
mand.
The essential issue here, that is being worked
out in various industries, is the extent of hierarchic
control necessary to capture the economic benefits.
Hierarchic control structures,  established through
contracting  or  integration,  have  substantial  costs
and risks.  These typically include  increased  asset
allocation,  relationship  risk,  and  supply/volume
control issues.  Overall,  a  market  often  provides
transparency and competitive-neither of which are
guaranteed  through  contracting  or  integration-
prices for  inputs.  As such, hierarchic  governance
systems may be impractical or overly costly.
Because  of its potential for a broader strategic
agenda and more comprehensive membership from
across the marketing chain, ISPC can provide an-
other institutional option for overcoming the nega-
tive performance effects listed in Table 1. The fol-
lowing section will more specifically  comment on
the range of strategies open to ISPC for doing this.
It is hypothesized that ISPC will be most relevant
to an industry situation in which most, if not all, of
the structural conditions cited in Table  1 occur si-
multaneously  in  a  sector,  thereby  necessitating  a
broad strategic agenda, and solutions to marketing
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problems demand participation from multiple lev-
els in the marketing chain, thereby necessitating a
broad industry membership.  These two conditions
would appear to make ISPC a stronger alternative
than other, more traditional  forms of group action
given their limitations as argued above. However,
these  conditions  may result in vertical  integration
within the ownership of one firm or within a strong
contract  system.  Hence,  a third condition for the
effectiveness  of ISPC might thus be the infeasibil-
ity of vertical integration-e.g.,  a sector too frag-
mented and capital intensive for a single owner to
integrate-or the desire of the fragmented entities
in a sector to retain some level of independence. In
the first case (infeasibility), ISPC would appear to
be a dominate organizational  alternative. In the sec-
ond case (desire of entities),  ISPC would have  to
prove itself superior to a vertical-integration  alter-
native in operation.  This could occur if hierarchi-
cal coordination,  through contracts or integration,
is simply impractical  or unnecessary to fully cap-
ture available economic benefits. The likelihood of
such  superiority would be  an  empirical  issue  be-
yond the scope of this introductory paper.
Benefits  of Industry Strategic Planning
A key issue in the feasibility of ISPC to provide an
alternative to vertical integration (consolidation)  or
traditional group action is whether or not such an
effort provides  economic  benefits.  The following
subsections  provide a menu of ISPC benefits and
review their use in two industry cases. An overall
summary for the two industries, indicating areas of
benefits provided,  is found in Table 2.
Achieve  Strategic Change in Fragmented or
Dispersed  Industries
Agricultural  industries  often have  not responded
quickly or at all to important needed changes - even
after such  changes  have been well identified.  For
example, the problems  associated with fat in hogs
(an important quality  concern) was recognized  at
least twenty years ago (Hayenga et al.  1985). Con-
sumers wanted a lean product, but incentives to pro-
ducers continued to be based largely on live weight.
This provided  powerful  incentives  for alternative
marketing  channels  and integration  to develop.
Recent effects are evident from increased levels of
contracting  and captive  supply in the pork indus-
try.  Similar problems  in  other industries  include
longstanding  quality issues  related to  cleanliness
and  grading  in U.S.  wheat  (Webb,  Haley,  and
Leetmaa  1995; Hill  1987) as  well as fat and yield
grade for beef (Schroeder  et al.  1998).  These ex-
amples  suggest  that even  when  an important  op-
portunity or  need  clearly  exists,  many industries





Achieve  Strategic Change
*  Develop an Overall Awareness of Industry Issues
*  Identify  Strategies to Improve Performance
*  Implement Strategies
Improve Supply-Chain  Management
*  Transmit Customer Demand
*  Develop Critical Mass
Develop  Industry Public Goods
*  Prioritize Research  Objectives

















Lvfor~d,  Peterson,  and SternsJournal  of Food Distribution  Research
do  not  seem to  respond  in any  strategic,  coordi-
nated  manner with obvious  implications  for the
relevant  industries. 7
ISPC is a means for achieving  change  within
an industry.  Strategic management for firms is in-
tended to bring about change that will enable long-
term competitive  success. Translated into industry
terms, this change would be achieved by:
1.  Developing  an  overall  shared  industry
awareness of industry needs and opportu-
nities;
2.  Identifying  industry strategies that can be
expected to lead to long-term industry suc-
cess;
3.  Implementing  the strategies.
In both  the Michigan  apple  and Texas  vegetable
industries  these  steps  were  accomplished.  This
means  that the  industries  are  seeking to  develop
and implement pro-active strategies toward enhanc-
ing their competitive success and long-term viabil-
ity-i.e., achieving strategic  change.
Improve Supply Chain Management
One of the key  features of performance  for a pro-
duction-marketing  system  is  its  effectiveness  in
vertical coordination (Mighell and Jones).  Several
important  industry  structural  features  have  been
identified earlier that could limit the vertical-coor-
dination effectiveness of agricultural industries (i.e.,
fragmented marketing chains, commodity produc-
tion, perishability,  and uncertainty  about produc-
tion levels).  In general, ISPC could be a source of
alternative coordination  through improving infor-
mation transfer (e.g.,  end-user demands for quality
traits) and  strategic  alignment  of the actions  and
choices of individual firms across the supply chain
(e.g., new product development).
ISPC would not, of course, preclude individual
efforts by industry  firms to capture  opportunities
for themselves.  In some cases, ISPC could help an
industry's  firms recognize  opportunities  that they
could take advantage of. This could encourage firms
to  develop private  arrangements  between  them-
selves to help meet customer needs in critical areas
such as developing a critical mass of suppliers of a
quality feature or variety. Alternatively, ISPC could
simply raise awareness of key issues and help ana-
lyze  those  issues  within  a broader  supply-chain
context.  This means that an ISPC effort need  not
preclude private forms of coordination, but can sim-
ply seek to facilitate or encourage effective action.
Transmit Customer Quality Demand
An important issue that needs effective  responses
by agricultural industries  is the changing nature of
customer demands, including quality requirements
and  specific demand  features. However,  the frag-
mented  structure  of agricultural  production  and
marketing often leads to difficulties in effectively
identifying  and  responding  to  consumer  demand
in  the marketing  system.  This has  been noted in
several agricultural  industries, including  the grain
industry  (Hill  1990)  and  the  cattle  industry
(Shroeder et al.  1998).8
Individual firms have access to a limited set of
information based on their own market experiences
and public market information that may be supple-
mented  by  specific market-research  efforts.  The
separation  in the  vertical  agricultural  system  be-
tween producers and consumers has frequently led
to slow changes and ineffective responsiveness to
changing consumer needs. This has provided a pow-
erful  incentive  for vertical  integration  by owner-
ship.
ISPC could help facilitate increasing effective-
ness  in the marketing  system by identifying con-
sumer needs and developing effective industry re-
sponses  to meet these changing demands. For ex-
ample,  industry  strategic  planning could,  as with
the Michigan apple industry strategic planning, fa-
cilitate studies to identify specific aspects of chang-
ing demand,  preferences  and consumer  require-
ments.9 In that ISPC a series of focus groups and
surveys were used to determine specific consumer
quality preferences,  and this information  was pro-
8  For example, trade is frequently based largely on grades
and standards  that can become  increasingly  less relevant  as
customer needs change and diversify.
7 Some agricultural  economists  have  noted that  the
institution for collective or group action often is missing even
though there are possible gains from such action (Shaffer  1980;
Schmid  1987).
9 Specifically, Michigan apple industry strategic planning
focused its  efforts  to  better understand  and respond  to
consumers'  quality needs, such as apples with a high level of
crispness  and good taste.
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vided  to  the industry.  In addition,  several efforts
were  developed  and initiated  within this industry
towards improving quality management and better
meeting consumer needs.
An industry strategic planning effort hence has
the potential to facilitate improved information flow
and adjustments  to consumer  demand.  What  dif-
ferentiates this process within the context of ISPC
is that the information  is  developed by and made
simultaneously available to entities at multiple lev-
els  within the  supply  chain.  Ideally,  all  relevant
decision  makers  (i.e.,  those within the chain who
are needed to respond to the consumer signals) are
present in ISPC.
Develop a Critical  Mass of a New Product
Certain beneficial changes in industry performance
may require  a critical mass of product volume or
change adopters to achieve success.' 0Critical-mass
theory and the potential benefits of a critical mass
were modeled extensively by Schelling (1978) and
discussed by Dixit and Nalebuff (1991). Schelling
indicates  that  many  systems  have  a "tipping"  or
critical-mass  point based in system dynamics.  If a
critical  mass  is achieved,  the  system can  achieve
dramatically  improved outcomes. Achieving criti-
cal mass often involves production and processing
changes at multiple levels in the supply chain.  Ef-
forts by one or several individual firms, especially
in  fragmented  agricultural  industries  with  many
small  firms  at multiple  supply-chain  levels,  will
likely be insufficient  in themselves to achieve  the
beneficial  outcome of critical mass.
ISPC could both aid in identifying the needed
changes  or types of products  appropriate  for the
market  and  facilitate  the  development  of critical
mass for effective changes. For example, a substan-
tial quantity of a certain new apple or wheat vari-
ety may need to be supplied to customers in order
for the  industry to be  viewed as  a consistent  and
reliable  supplier of the  new product,  and  thus to
gain  initial and  continued  access  to retailer  shelf
space or a food manufacturer's ingredient lists. The
'0 Certain changes  can  be  established  if a critical  mass
within  an industry  creates  the  change.  For  example,  if a
sufficient number of firms use a particular quality description
of their  product,  this  quality  description  may become  the
standard  for the industry.  The change  is establishing the new
quality  standard.
challenges of  producing hard white wheat on a large
enough scale to be used by millers is a specific ex-
ample.  A minimum critical  mass of volume of a
product or variety may also be necessary  for con-
sumers to learn about the new product. At the same
time, processors need critical mass to innovate and
implement  changes at their  level to  facilitate  the
new market or product.  ISPC  within an  industry
for new variety development and introduction could
work to address  this  issue.  Vertical  integration
might achieve the same end, but with the downside
of further market  consolidation.  Other  group-ac-
tion alternatives do not have as ready access to the
key decision  makers at multiple levels in the sup-
ply chain.
For example,  the  strategy  to develop  a "pre-
mium grade"  for Michigan  fresh apples  is highly
dependent  on developing  a critical  mass of grow-
ers and shippers in Michigan who can supply apples
that meet the standards of this grade (where such a
grade could be defined by a set of quality charac-
teristics important  to key customer  bases).  How-
ever, Michigan traditionally  has not been viewed
as  a  consistent  supplier of "premium"  apples.
Knowing this, retailers may be reluctant to source
"premium  grade"  apples  from  Michigan,  fearing
that the Michigan industry would not have adequate
supplies on  an annual basis.  New  incentives  for
growers  and  shippers to  make  the  capital invest-
ments necessary to produce and market "premium"
apples  could be  created with the new  grade,  and
the critical mass created could assure retailers that
the industry is now in the position to provide a con-
sistent supply. However, this strategy has not been
selected for implementation.
Develop Industry Public  and Club Goods
Within  agricultural industries  there  are many dif-
ferent forms of industry public and club goods (i.e.,
goods with high exclusion costs, goods with mar-
ginal  costs  of adding  new users  near or  equal to
zero, goods with joint impact). Firms producing a
particular product in a region face similar produc-
tion and marketing issues because the region typi-
cally has  a specific  set of production  capabilities
based upon common weather conditions and pests
as  well  as  localized  external  conditions  such  as
taxes,  property  rights,  and  availability  of trained
personnel.  For  example,  the production  research
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developed  at many  Land-Grant  Universities  has
often worked toward improving the production ca-
pabilities-varieties,  strains,  etc.-available  to
firms  that produce  and market  from a particular
region. Thus a state's Land-Grant University typi-
cally has an important role in providing the public
goods of that state's agricultural industries. An in-
dustry  strategic planning  effort can act in  a con-
certed  effort to  promote  the  development  of an
industry's public  or club goods. For example,  the
Texas vegetable industry has sought to develop an
industry-wide  onion  exchange.  Similarly,  the
Michigan apple industry supported an effort to ob-
tain  U.S.  government  funding  for  research  on
fireblight,  a disease with serious consequences  to
the production of apples  in Michigan.  This fund-
ing  effort was  eventually  successful  and may re-
sult in improved Michigan  apple production if the
fireblight problem is more effectively controlled.
Industiy Voice
An important type of public or club good that can
be provided to the industry by ISPC is that the pro-
cess may become  a focal point for industry com-
munication and group action. The outcome of ISPC
often represents to some extent the collective  will
of  the industry on certain issues. The improved unity
and ability  to  communicate  can occur within the
industry  itself as  well  as  with organizations  out-
side the industry. For example, the Michigan apple
strategic planning effort was able to communicate
as an industry with the U.S. Department of Agri-
culture to develop a favorable protocol to meet the
phytosanitary  regulations  for  a major  importing
country.  Similarly,  the  Texas  vegetable  industry
developed  Project Plant-"Produce  Leadership
and  Assessment  of Needs  for Texas"-part  of
which  focused  on communicating  industry  needs
to the Texas legislature.  This unity and communi-
cation is typically difficult in many industries  de-
spite the presence of many group-action  organiza-
tions. Indeed,  the many different industry  organi-
zations,  such as producer-led  organizations  and
marketer-led  organizations,  may rarely  meet and
discuss critical  issues with each other.  This often
precludes effective action on many issues. Hence,
effectiveness from other group-action  alternatives
(e.g. generic promotion or large cooperatives) could
be enhanced by ISPC.
Prioritized  Research
Related to improved industry voice, ISPC can also
develop an improved understanding of priority ar-
eas for research that have the potential to improve
"local" industry's production capabilities (i.e., tar-
get the process by which public goods are provided).
ISPC could also aid in mobilizing resources to ad-
dress a particular area that needs more research at-
tention (i.e.,  target the development of a particular
public good). Both the Texas vegetable and Michi-
gan apple  industries developed lists of prioritized
areas  needed to improve  performance  in their in-
dustries. Facilitative research such as at Land-Grant
Universities  also could then emphasize  these pri-
ority  areas.1 Furthermore,  ISPC identification of
areas of needed research can stimulate private-sec-
tor research  and  effort.  Porter notes  that joint re-
search projects in emerging technical  areas have a
stimulating  effect  on the  success  of an  industry
(1990, 636).
Performance, Collusion, and Industry Strategic
Planning
A key issue for economists in evaluating any eco-
nomic activity  is the  effect of the activity  on the
entire system from producers to consumers.  In the
preceding section, important economic motivations
and  rationale  were developed  for ISPC that indi-
cate  potential  industry  benefit through  improved
performance.  Consumers  may also  benefit  from
ISPC  as  an  industry becomes  more  effective  in
meeting  their needs.  However,  an important  con-
sideration  is whether or not an industry  strategic
planning effort can reasonably be expected to have
a positive impact on consumers.  This  analysis  is
especially  important because,  historically,  "coor-
dination"  efforts by firms are  often viewed suspi-
ciously by  economists.  One  consideration  in  this
analysis is whether or not ISPC would provide more
benefits to  consumers compared to an alternative
of more vertical integration and consolidation.
Agriculture  in  general  has  had  a number  of
"group" coordination efforts with potential risks to
consumers. For example, producers with a federal
" In the Michigan apple industry such a list was developed
to communicate industry research needs to researchers and has
been used to justify research in the targeted areas.
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marketing order that allows quality restrictions have
some  incentive to restrict quantity through overly
restrictive  minimum quality standards  (Bockstael
1987). Similarly, a cooperative in a region can seek
to control prices in a region. However, despite these
concerns  the general  benefits  of group-action  al-
ternatives have been seen to be positive.
A reasonable  approach  to  evaluating  the po-
tential for collusion in an industry would be to use
an industrial-organization  approach,  such  as  that
followed by Connor as well as by Scherer and Ross.
In this  type of approach,  there  are  structural  fea-
tures that  are  generally  considered  to  make  pos-
sible  cartel  (i.e.,  quantity-  or price-fixing)  behav-
ior. The following  analysis is based on the typical
industry structure  described earlier in this article.
Large Numbers of Firms with a High Degree of
Rivalry
One of the key  difficulties  that any  industry
would have  in actually  establishing  some  sort  of
cartel is the large number of firms and the amount
of rivalry  in an industry.  Typically, firms  in most
agricultural industries are  highly competitive with
one  another.  Although  ISPC provides  a  structure
for these individual firms to work together, the re-
lation-based effort  only focuses on selected areas
and individual firms continue to compete with one
another. Competitive rivalry generally remains, and
in fact the experiences  in the Michigan  apple and
Texas vegetable  industries support this thesis.
Limiting Effects  of Competition from  Other
Industries
Competition  from  other  industries  that  supply a
similar set of products would usually provide strong
limitations  on the impact  of any  cartel  activities
initiated  by an  industry.  Most  commodity  indus-
tries have both domestic and international compe-
tition. Competitor industries supplying the same or
very  similar products would  likely  increase  their
own sales and hence substantially mitigate price or
profit effects of a move to increase prices through
restricting quantity. The decrease in quantity by the
industry  that tried  to  accomplish  such behavior
would allow the competitor  industries  to increase
market volume.
Limiting Effects  of Competition from  Other
Products
Other agricultural  products  (or synthetics)  almost
always  can to  some  extent  be substituted  for the
products  supplied by a commodity industry.  This
substitution  effect  provides  a limitation  on  any
industry's potential supply-limiting effort. For ex-
ample, strawberries compete with blueberries, rasp-
berries,  and other fruit products, while wheat com-
petes with corn,  rice,  and other grains. Efforts by
an industry to increase prices through monopolis-
tic practices would be mitigated by substitute prod-
ucts.
Instability of Collusive Efforts
A fourth important factor is that even if an industry
could make  some  temporary  monopoly gains  for
themselves,  these would  likely be unstable.  Indi-
vidual firms in  an industry would have  an incen-
tive to  refuse  to  cooperate  with  the "monopoly"
behavior by supplying more to the market (Green
and Porter  1984). Also, some theory suggests that
monopoly price setting  is unstable  in the  face  of
either rapidly increasing  demand (Rotemberg  and
Saloner 1986) or a slump in demand (Tirole  1990,
252). In those situations firms tend to not cooper-
ate in a discipline of quantity restriction.
Implications
The  common structural  characteristics  of agricul-
tural  industries  make  the possibility  of collusion
fairly  low  according  to  what would be  expected
from industrial-organization  theory.  Essentially,  a
commodity industry is unlikely to be able to effec-
tively  collude  to restrict quantity.  Industries with
very few firms with a high degree of vertical inte-
gration are much more prone to collusion, as high-
lighted by the recent ADM price-fixing conspiracy
(Connor 1997).
Overview  and Concluding  Statements
In summary, ISPC and its focus on the entire sup-
ply chain can provide important economic benefits
for agricultural industries. These economic benefits
arise from  common features  or structures of agri-
culture industries, including fragmented marketing
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chains,  commodity  production,  asset  fixity,  and
weather impacts. Where these structural conditions
exist, ISPC is more likely to have substantial ben-
efit.  Economic  benefits  can be  achieved  through
undertaking  industry efforts that include increased
information  on changing  customer  preferences,
acknowledgment  of and responsiveness  to these
changing customer needs, and provision of indus-
try club or public  goods. To  the extent that such
goods  can  be more  effectively  supported or pro-
vided through ISPC than through integration, ISPC
will likely  be successful  over time. By achieving
these benefits, industry strategic planning can help
small agricultural firms compete and thus limit the
trend in many industries toward  domination by a
few firms that are either horizontally or vertically
integrated,  or both.
Experiences  with ISPC have been limited to a
relatively  small number of industries  for a limited
period of time.  This article  is intended to provide
an indication  of the potential  of ISPC. Future  re-
search can usefully be pursued to establish ISPC as
an effective roadmap  for providing economic ben-
efits for the economic viability and success of ag-
ricultural  industries.
These economic benefits point to the potential
for industry strategic planning to be used as an ef-
fective tool both by policy makers and within the
land-grant system. It is a tool that differs from other
group-action approaches in agriculture since it can
extend  across  the vertical  production-marketing-
processing  system in an industry and by its use of
strategic  planning  tools.  Yet the approach  would
enhance and not compete with the effectiveness of
existing group  efforts  towards  industry  competi-
tive success. Industry strategic planning is not, how-
ever, a "miracle cure" for the issues and challenges
facing agriculture.  Rather, it is one potentially im-
portant tool that should be considered in the mar-
ketplace  of ideas  to enhance  performance  within
agriculture  while  assisting the  ability  of smaller
entities to remain viable.
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